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Michael Devitt has argued that Chomsky, along with many other Linguists and 
philosophers, is ignorant of the true nature of Generative Linguistics. In particular, 
Devitt argues that Chomsky and others wrongly believe the proper object of linguistic 
inquiry to be speakers' competences, rather than the languages that speakers are 
competent with. In return, some commentators on Devitt's work have returned the 
accusation, arguing that it is Devitt who is ignorant about Linguistics. In this note, I 
consider whether there might be less to this apparent dispute than meets the eye. 
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1. Accusations of Ignorance. 
 
Michael Devitt’s recent book Ignorance of Language (Devitt, 2006) has sparked a 
great deal of critical discussion. One might say that it’s hit a nerve. But it’s not clear 
to me exactly what the locus of dispute amounts to. In this note I want to step back a 
bit and ask whether, once some of the dust has settled, we might find rather a lot of 
agreement between Devitt and his seeming opponents, and not a lot of disagreement. 
My minimal aim is to invite Devitt to say a bit more about his position in the hope 
that that might help to focus subsequent discussion. 
 
Devitt argues that even its most prominent practitioners are mistaken as to the nature 
of Linguistics.2 Noam Chomsky has claimed that the topic of Linguistics as studied 
within the generative tradition is not—or, not primarily—language (at least as 
                                                 
1 Earlier versions were presented at a workshop on Devitt’s work at the University of Nottingham and 
at a conference on the Philosophy of Linguistics at the ICU in Dubrovnik. Thanks to the audiences on 
both occasions and also to Robert Black, John Collins, Greg Currie, Michael Devitt, Gareth Fitzgerald, 
Jennifer Hornsby, Peter Ludlow, Robert Matthews, Georges Rey, Gabriel Segal, Barry C. Smith, Mark 
Textor, Charles Travis. In what follows, I draw on unpublished work by Devitt that may not represent 
his official position. The purpose is to pursue some of the issues raised in that work, regardless of their 
status in Devitt’s own account, itself a matter of limited interest in the context of naturalistic inquiry. 
2 My focus throughout is, like Devitt’s, core Generative Linguistics. Prima facie, at least, it is irrelevant 
how the issues to be discussed play out with respect to e.g. Sociolinguistics. 
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language typically has been viewed by philosophers3). So, the primary object of 
inquiry is not the various systems of expressions together with their phonetic, 
grammatical and semantical properties. Rather, the primary object of inquiry is the 
properties of humans through which they have a range of psychological capacities 
associated, more or less, with commonsense cases of linguistic competence. In this, 
Chomsky has been followed by the vast preponderance of Generative Linguists and 
Philosophers of Linguistics. In the face of this consensus, Devitt argues that, once one 
attends to some elementary distinctions, it can be seen that Chomsky has (and others 
have) got this wrong. Linguistics is—as etymology predicts—about languages and 
their properties, rather than about language users and their properties. And Devitt 
proposes this as an account of what Linguistics is about, rather than what it should be 
about. This is because he wants to leave standing what he sees as the great fruits of 
Linguistics thus far. In a recent attempt to clarify his position, Devitt puts the last 
point as follows: 
 
…I am not against the research strategy of producing generative grammars in 
pretty much the way they are being produced. (2007, p.2.) 
 
Devitt continues in a footnote: 
 
…What linguists do does indeed determine the domain of linguistics... That’s 
one thing. Opinions about what domain has been so determined is another. 
(2007, p.2, fn4.) 
 
Hence, Devitt is committed to viewing Chomsky, and others, as mistaken—
ignorant—about the true subject matter of Generative Linguistics as they pursue it. 
 
Predictably enough, those who seek to sustain Chomsky’s view of the subject matter 
of Linguistics have returned the accusation. They have accused Devitt of ignorance of 
Linguistics. They have alleged that, since it is obvious to those who know about 
Generative Linguistics that its subject matter is properties of speakers, not products of 
                                                 
3 For purposes of this note, I remain neutral as to the metaphysical status of language or languages. It 
may be that there are genuine dispute between Devitt and Chomsky regarding that status, but in the 
first instance the issues discussed here can (and, I believe, should) be pursued independently of any 
such dispute. 
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exercises of capacities of speakers, Devitt would only make the claims that he does if 
he failed to know obvious facts about Linguistics. 
 
So, we are presented with two accusations of ignorance. A first question that needs to 
be addressed is: Which, if any, is right? Notice that, at least in the first instance, these 
accusations of ignorance do not concern this or that particular finding in Linguistics. 
They concern the large-scale architecture of the discipline as a whole. What sort of 
claims does the Linguist aim to make? What sorts of method are appropriate for 
assessing those claims? So, we should not expect the issue to be resolved by appeal to 
a single critical piece of evidence that one or another party has simply missed. 
 
Given a preliminary answer to the first question, we should consider a second. How is 
the proposed distribution of ignorance (and, perhaps, knowledge) to be explained? For 
instance, suppose Chomsky is ignorant of Linguistics. How is his ignorance to be 
explained? Crucially, any such explanation must not undermine the following 
Moorean fact: Chomsky has instigated, and sustained, the most successful research 
program in the history of Linguistics. If no suitable explanation is forthcoming, its 
absence will surely place pressure on the preliminary finding that it is Chomsky who 
is ignorant. 
 
So, we need answers to two questions: 
 
(Question 1) Who, in this dispute, is ignorant of the nature of Linguistics? 
 
(Question 2) How is their ignorance to be explained? 
 
I shall focus here on the first question. But it is important, in considering that 




We should begin by distinguishing what I’ll call a view of the target of a science from 
an approach to pursuing work within the science. Crudely, a view is a large-scale take 
on what the science is about, its primary object of inquiry, the nature of its proper 
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objects, and so forth. An approach consists of the actual methods, sources of 
evidence, etc. employed within the science. Then the putative dispute between Devitt 
and Chomsky is supposed primarily to concern the correct view of the discipline of 
Linguistics. In effect, the initial accusation of ignorance from Devitt is that 
Chomsky’s view is based on ignorance; and the counter-accusation is that Devitt’s 
view is so based. 
At the most general level, there are four potential outcomes to this dispute: 
 
(A) Chomsky is ignorant; Devitt is also ignorant. 
 
(B) Chomsky is not ignorant; Devitt is. 
 
(C) Chomsky is ignorant; Devitt is not. 
 
(D) Neither Chomsky nor Devitt is ignorant. 
 
I have ranked the options by first blush plausibility. Since Linguistics is an empirical 
science, and since we are rightly modest about our epistemic powers with respect to 
the nature of empirical science, (A) has the most initial plausibility. However, the 
present question concerns how things stand to the best of our present knowledge. So, 
we can safely set (A) aside.4 
 
(B) has the next greatest initial plausibility. Unless the development of Chomsky’s 
approach to Linguistics has been cognitively insulated from his large-scale view 
about the object of inquiry, we should expect epistemic support for his view to flow 
from epistemic support for the approach, hence theories, developed on its basis. 
Hence, on the assumption that Chomsky’s view has shaped his approach, the 
epistemic success of Linguistics provides some support for his view. But it seems that 
                                                 
4 It might be suggested that, since Chomsky is a linguist, it is not initially plausible 
that he would have the wrong view of linguistics. However, there are two reasons for 
thinking that such a suggestion would be mistaken. First, the fact that even the very 
best practitioners of particular empirical sciences often disagree about foundational 
matters indicates that their views on such matters can be mistaken. Second, the usual 
pessimistic induction from the fates of past views of leading practitioners of empirical 
sciences make it somewhat plausible that current views are at least partly, and perhaps 
largely, mistaken. 
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the success of Linguistics can supply no such support for Devitt’s view, since—on the 
assumption that it differs from Chomsky’s view—it has played no such role in 
guiding the approaches of practicing Linguists. 
 
Next we have (C). It’s not out of the question that a Philosopher could correct the 
large-scale views of prominent practitioners of a science. It can be claimed, with some 
plausibility, that this has in fact happened in the history of Philosophy. For instance, 
there is some plausibility to the claim that, when Operationalism fell out of favour 
around the middle of the twentieth century, this was due in part to Philosophical 
considerations. That said, the stagnation induced by Operationalism in the fields it 
governed—the fields in which it shaped approaches—played a more prominent role 
in its end. But that is consistent with Philosophy having hastened its end. So, it’s not 
out of the question that a Philosopher might correct a scientist in this way. But claims 
to that effect should be viewed with some suspicion, I think. And suspicion is apt 
especially when the Philosophical claim is that the view in question could reasonably 
govern approaches to a science, but in fact fails to. For, unlike the claim that 
Operationalism is bankrupt quite generally, the latter sort of claim does not appear to 
be the sort of claim that could be assessed from the armchair. Since Devitt’s claim is 
that a view like Chomsky’s could guide approaches within sciences other than 
Linguistics—for instance, that it could guide psycholinguistics—it would appear to 
require detailed empirical study of the practice of Linguistics in order to establish 
whether or not the view is operative there. For if we agree that there could be a 
science called ‘Linguistics’ that was guided by a view like Chomsky’s, then it is hard 
to see how arguments not based on consideration of the practice actually called 
‘Linguistics’ could bear on the question whether that practice is actually guided by 
such a view. 
 
Finally, (D). Again, I don’t think that it’s out of the question that both parties to such 
a dispute could be right, so not ignorant, although in typical cases it would be the 
most surprising of the four outcomes. 
 
 Let’s label an approach to inquiry in some broad domain that is supported, as 
it turns out by empirical success, APPROACH. And let’s label one large-scale view, 
able to support or guide APPROACH, VIEW1. Finally, let’s use VIEW2 as a label for 
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a putatively alternative view, also able to guide APPROACH. As far as I can tell, we 
would have outcome (D) if at least one of the following held: 
 
(1) VIEW1 and VIEW2 are distinct, are both genuinely able to guide 
APPROACH, could both guide APPROACH in the same way and to the same 
extent, and there is nothing other than guidance of APPROACH that allows us 
to choose between those views. 
 
(2) VIEW1 and VIEW2 are the same view, notational variants of one another, etc. 
 
(3) VIEW1 and VIEW2 are distinct, but they are both instances of a more general 
view, SUPER-VIEW, that is able to guide APPROACH, etc. 
 
In the present case, we would have something like the following: 
 
(1') VIEW1 is the view that the primary object of linguistic inquiry is language, and 
its properties. VIEW2 is the view that the object of inquiry is speakers, and their 
properties. Both views could guide the actual APPROACH to Linguistics in the 
same way and to the same extent, and there is nothing other than their guidance of 
that APPROACH that allows us to choose between the views. 
 
(2') The two views as to the object of Linguistic inquiry are notational variants of 
one another (since, e.g., linguistic properties just are properties of speakers or the 
relevant properties of speakers just are linguistic properties). 
 
(3') The two views are instances of the more general view, SUPERVIEW, 
according to which, since relevant properties of speakers and relevant properties of 
language mutually determine one another, one can approach Linguistics from 
either end of the telescope. 
 
Although I think that, at first blush, (D) can seem to be the least likely outcome of 
such a dispute, I also think that testing for (D) has epistemic priority. In order to 
engage with confidence in such a dispute, we need to have assured ourselves that we 
are involved in a genuine dispute, so that at most one party can be victorious. And in 
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order to engage productively, we need to have a clear view of what, if anything, is at 
issue and so what sorts of considerations would count for or against one or another 
party to the dispute. 
 
I want to suggest that, implausible as it may seem on initial inspection, the apparent 
dispute between Devitt and Chomsky may very well be only apparent. If I’m wrong, it 
would be helpful, at least to me, if Devitt were able to help me to see more clearly 
wherein exactly the real disagreement resides. 
 
3. Mutual determination. 
 
As earlier quotes make plain, Devitt seeks an account of the subject matter of 
Linguistics as it is practiced, perhaps allowing for some self-conception driven errors 
at the periphery. Pursuit of such an account is therefore at least partly an empirical 
pursuit, a matter of fitting theory of subject matter to observation of Linguistic 
practice, including theory construction and output theories.  Devitt is therefore 
committed to holding that widespread adoption of his view would have (little or) no 
impact upon the practice of practicing Linguists. In fact, I think that Devitt thinks that 
widespread adoption of his view would have (little or) no impact on practice because 
he thinks that Linguists are already guided by it, at least to a significant extent. What 
would make a difference, on Devitt’s view, would be if Linguists were to start guiding 
their research according to Chomsky’s view. Now this claim requires careful 
handling. I take it that many Linguists, including Chomsky himself, think that they are 
guided by Chomsky’s view, or something like it. Otherwise they would make more 
explicit their opposition to the view that Chomsky presents, and Devitt would have an 
easier time summoning support for his position. So, an explanation would be wanted 
for Linguists’ ignorance—or at least reticence—concerning the grounds of their own 
practice. And as far as I can see, Devitt does not seek to provide such an explanation. 
But let’s leave that issue to one side. The question remains whether it would really 
make any difference if Linguists were to guide their practice according to the views of 
Chomsky rather than Devitt, and if so, what difference it would make. 
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Now consider Devitt’s response to the complaint that his view would render 
mysterious Linguists’ commonplace appeals to psychological evidence, e.g. those 
arising from acquisition studies: 
 
It is one thing for a theory to have psychological evidence, it is another for it to 
be psychological. Any theory can be supported by all sorts of evidence [Duhem-
Quine]… (Devitt, 2008, p.678) 
 
Well, in the abstract what Devitt says is, of course, true. But the central point of the 
Duhem-Quine thesis is that the connection between a theory and its evidence is itself 
mediated by theory. So in order for psychological evidence to bear on a theory of 
linguistic properties, a theory mediating the connection between psychology and 
language is required. Of course, the theory that linguistic properties are, or are 
determined directly by, psychological properties is only one such theory, though 
perhaps it’s the most obvious. What, then, is Devitt’s alternative theory? 
 He writes: 
 
psychological facts together with social and environmental facts determine 
linguistic facts. (2006, p.39) 
 
So, to that extent, his mediating theory seems to agree with the Linguist’s. However, 
Devitt continues: 
 
But this determination does not make linguistic facts psychological… (2008, 
p.679) 
 
Even if symbols have their properties in virtue of certain mental facts that would 
not make the theory of those symbols about those facts and so would not make the 
theory part of psychology. Indeed, consider the consequences of supposing it 
would, and then generalizing: every theory—economic, psychological, biological, 
etc.—would be about physical facts and part of physics because physical facts 
ultimately determine everything. A special science does not lose its own domain 
because that domain supervenes on another. (2006, p.40) 
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Again, what Devitt says is, in the abstract, quite correct. But the question whether a 
special science has a proprietary domain, rather than being absorbed by a subvening 
domain, is not trivial to answer. In particular, the answer to such a question depends 
on whether the special science has its own proprietary generalizations and 
explanations, and does not simply restate the generalizations and explanations already 
contained in the subvening domain. For instance, it is only because (or insofar as) 
psychology is able to capture generalisations, and to offer explanations, that differ 
from the generalizations and explanations offered in physics (and biology, etc.), that 
psychology is taken to have its own domain. And that would seem to depend upon 
failure of mutual determination by the facts and explanations in the two domains, so 
that the generalisations and explanations available therein do not fix one another. Or, 
more minimally, and assuming mutual determination of the facts in the two domains, 
it would seem to depend upon there being some special explanatory priority attending 






As far as I can tell, Devitt offers no reason to think that there is a failure of mutual 
dependence between relevant psychological facts and relevant linguistic facts. That is, 
he provides no reason for expecting linguistic properties not to supervene on 
competence properties, or expecting competence properties not to supervene on 
linguistic properties. Indeed, his adherence to what he calls the “respect” constraint 
appears to foreclose on his allowing for such failure. Let me explain. 
 Devitt uses a variety of analogies, including inquiry into the properties of the 
waggle dance of the bee, in order to draw an important distinction. The distinction is 
between a competence—and e.g. explanations for features of a competence—and the 
products of that competence—and e.g. explanations for features of those products. 
Thus, Devitt suggests, it is one thing to study the dance of the bee—a product—and 
another thing to study the bee competence responsible for sustaining dances with 
those properties. This is so, we might think—and echoing Devitt’s earlier warning—
even if it should turn out that the relevant properties of the bee-dance are determined 
by relevant properties of bees’ competences. But Devitt does not think that the studies 
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are independent. For he thinks that study of the products of a competence—e.g., the 
bees’ dance—can be revealing about the nature of the competence itself. This is so 
because 
 
…the state of competence, and the embodied processing rules that constitute it, must 
“respect” the structure rules of the dance in that they are apt to produce dances that 
are governed by those rules. (2007, p.4.) 
 
Thus, Devitt’s “respect” constraint. Devitt continues: 
 
So, on the strength of von Frisch’s theory we know this minimal proposition about 
any competent bee: that there is something-we-know-not-what within the bee that 
respects the structure rules that von Frisch discovered. (2007, p.4.) 
 
It follows that—with respect to the bee at least, and insofar as our claims about 
competence do not outstrip those determined by the respect constraint—relevant 
properties of the product determine relevant properties of the source competence. 
Hence, in this case, it is plausible that relevant properties of the bees’ dance are 
determined by relevant properties of their competence—again, at least insofar as those 
properties do not outstrip those determined by the respect constraint. And it is 
plausible, given the “respect” constraint, that relevant properties of the competence 
are determined by relevant properties of the bee dance. I’ll return to the bees in a 
moment. First, let me spell out the analogous view of language and linguistic 
competence. 
 The analogous view of language and linguistic competence would be the 
following. We begin by distinguishing two sorts of fact: first, facts about linguistic 
competence and its properties and, second, facts about language and its properties. If 
we like, we can also distinguish between the project of studying one and the project of 
studying the other. But it’s not yet clear why we should want to. For the relevant 
properties of language (e.g., its grammatical rules) are determined by relevant 
properties of the competence. And moreover, relevant properties of the competence 
are determined, via the “respect” constraint by properties of the language. 
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Unless one of the following conditions is met, then, it is apt to seem that there 
is only a pedantic distinction to be drawn between the two projects.5 First, we could 
reinstate a difference if it could be shown that a theory of the competence should go 
beyond properties determined by the properties of language together with the 
“respect” constraint. Second, we could reinstate a difference if it could be shown, for 
some reason other than a demanding view of competence, that mutual determination 
failed. (Perhaps, for instance, it fails because the relevant properties of language are 
not determined solely by properties of the competence). Third, we could reinstate a 
difference if it could be shown that, despite the mutual determination of language and 
linguistic competence, one or another determinant enjoys explanatory (or some other 
form of) priority. For instance, we could reinstate a difference if it could be shown 
that, although language and competence are guaranteed to run in step, the properties 
of the language are to be explained by properties of the competence (together with the 
fact that linguistic properties are fixed by competence) rather than vice versa. 
 Devitt responded to an earlier version of this suggestion by pointing out that 
he doesn’t think that linguistic properties supervene on competence properties; rather 
he thinks that they supervene on facts about thoughts. I have three things to say about 
Devitt’s response. First, it’s not clear that it’s true, even on Devitt’s own account. For 
even if the view were defensible that linguistic facts supervene on facts about thought, 
it wouldn’t follow that the linguistic facts don’t also supervene on facts about 
competence. They might do so, for instance, if competence facts also supervene on 
facts about thought. And if competence facts and linguistic facts were to come apart, 
then we would face two serious difficulties: first, we would lose the ability to explain 
how linguistic practice, focussed as it is upon competence, might reveal anything 
about the linguistic facts; second, we would need an account of how Linguists might 
go about studying those amongst the linguistic facts that fail to supervene on 
competence. Is there another way of getting at those facts, other than by relying on the 
operations of competent subjects?6 Second, even if it were true, it’s not clear how it 
                                                 
5 For pursuit of one view according to which the distinction is somewhat pedantic, see 
Longworth (2007). 
6 It might be suggested—and was suggested to me by Devitt—that, since mutual 
determination holds at most for those elements of the two domains that are controlled 
by the respect constraint, room is left for a large degree of independence of those 
elements that are not so controlled. I agree with the suggestion, but think that it raises 
the spectre of a serious difficulty for a view according to which linguists in fact 
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would help Devitt’s case. Without further argument, the worry would remain that only 
a pedantic distinction could be drawn between the projects of studying the structure of 
thought and studying the structure of language. Third, as has often been urged, there 
are numerous reasons for thinking that the structure of thought alone can’t sustain the 
distinctive properties of language. In particular, the properties of linguistic 
competence, and the linguistic properties the competence respects, appear 
idiosyncratic relative to other elements of cognition, and its objects. Ironically, if that 
is right, then it provides some reason for thinking that, despite mutual determination 
between cognition in general and linguistic competence, the study of competence is 
partly independent from the study of cognition in general. But it provides no support 
for the claim that there is a failure of mutual determination between linguistic 
competence and language. And it provides no support for the claim that the study of 





Let’s return to the bee dance. What would it take for there to be failure of mutual 
determination in that case?  
Well, suppose we thought that the bee dance could profitably be studied 
without appeal to any information about bee competence. Suppose, for instance, that 
we had been told that, sometimes and for whatever reason, bees waggle in this, that, 
and the other way (well, the view that they waggle is already somewhat competence-
theory laden, but let that pass). The project might be akin to a sort of puzzle, as when 
we ask students in the abstract how a presented series of numbers is to be continued. 
In pursuing this project, the practitioner aims to come up with an elegant 
characterisation of the relevant properties of the bee dance. And then, deploying the 
                                                 
prioritise the study of language over the study of competence. For linguists appear to 
show no interest in elements of language that are not determined by elements of 
competence. Of course, no such problem arises for a view according to which 
linguistic facts are exhaustively determined by competence facts, but competence 
facts outstrip linguistic facts. And the latter view has some independent plausibility. 
But as far as I know, Chomsky has never claimed that one might learn all there is to 
know about linguistic competence by studying the grammar that it determines. He has 
always allowed, for instance, that facts about the physical realisation of competence 
might go beyond those revealed by the study of grammar. 
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“respect” constraint, we use their characterisation as the basis for claims about bee 
competence: bees must be able to produce movements with the relevant properties. 
That would, admittedly, be a very thin account of bee competence. We might think, in 
those circumstances, that provision of an elegant characterisation of the bee dance left 
almost everything to play for with respect to the competence from which the dance 
issues. 
Alternatively, suppose we thought that bee-dance competence could profitably 
be studied without appeal to any information about bee dancing. Again—and setting 
aside the obvious qualms about this being a study of bees’ competence to dance—we 
might think that success in that endeavour left everything to play for with respect to 
relevant properties of the bees’ dance. 
Of course, either approach would be silly. No serious inquiry into properties of 
bee dance competence would be undertaken in isolation from information about bee 
dances. And no serious inquiry into properties of bee dancing would be undertaken 
without appeal to information about bee competence. What enabled Von Frisch to 
crack this particular code is that he had access, not only to how bees danced under 
normal circumstances, and how they danced under abnormal circumstances. He 
also—and crucially—had access to information about how other bees were able to 
make use of the dances with which they were presented. It is only because Von Frisch 
was able to compare properties of the bee dances with properties of spectator 
behaviour that he was able to get a view about the relevant properties of the dance. 
Anyone with a penchant for puzzles and a free afternoon could come up with an 
elegant characterisation of bee dances. Von Frisch won the Nobel Prize because he 
was able to come up with the relevant characterisation: the one the bees make use of. 
 
6. Language and Competence. 
 
As Devitt is keen to emphasise, the bee dance analogy is only an analogy. We should 
not, therefore, expect all its properties to transfer to the case of language and linguistic 
competence. But it seems to me that the cases are, in this respect, relevantly similar.  
If Linguists attempted to study the products of linguistic competence—noises, 
hand movements, etc.—independently of studying the ways in which competent 
speakers are able to exploit those products, then respecting the “respect” constraint 
would be quite unrevealing as to the nature of linguistic competence. And if Linguists 
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studied competence while disregarding the products of that competence—e.g., the fact 
that the relevant properties of speakers are those responsible (in broad terms) for 
facility with bits of speech—then the determination of linguistic properties by 
properties of the competence would, again, be useless as a guide to studying the 
linguistic properties.  
But that is not how the Linguist proceeds. Rather, the Linguist studies the 
properties of products of competence only as those properties are exploited by 
speakers, as revealed for instance in their intuitions about meaning, acceptability, etc. 
And the Linguist studies competence only insofar as it is taken to shape speakers’ 
appreciation of the relevant properties of their products. So, there is no immediate 
reason to think that there are really two different projects here. 
 Hence, we need additional reason to think that there really are two different 
projects here. That is, to repeat, we need reason to think that one of the following 
views is correct: 
 
(α) Linguistic competence properties and linguistic properties are not mutually 
determining because substantive claims about competence are bound to outstrip 
what is determined via the “respect” constraint. 
 
(β) They are not mutually determining because substantive claims about linguistic 
properties, of a sort made by Linguists, are bound to outstrip what is determined 
by facts about competence. 
 
(γ) Despite mutual determination, competence properties or linguistic properties 
enjoy explanatory (or some other sort of) priority. 
 
7. Does mutual determination fail? 
 
Since I don’t think Devitt wants to rest his conclusions on anything like (β), I shall 
ignore that option.7 Instead, I want to look very briefly at (α) and (γ), beginning with 
(α). Suppose that we had a detailed account of the properties of linguistic products to 
                                                 
7 The discussion at the end of section 4 bears on the upshot of Devitt taking up that 
option.  
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which we are responsive, so an account of their grammatical structures and the like. 
And suppose, moreover, that we had an account of the rules that generate those 
structures—again, not just any old rules able to do the job, but the rules that actually 
guide our performance. What would be missing?  
Well, potentially, quite a lot. We might, for instance, lack a detailed account of 
how those rules are put to use in real time engagements with linguistic strings. And 
we might lack information about the detailed architecture, and neurological 
implementation, of competence. But few Linguists would claim that it is their 
immediate aim to fill that sort of gap in our knowledge. Although there has been some 
discussion about such issues, and about whether Linguistics itself furnishes results of 
the required sort, I don’t think Devitt really aims to engage in that discussion. After 
all, his major opponent here is Chomsky. And Chomsky has never made sufficiently 
ambitious claims about the reach of Generative Linguistics for him to count as an 
opponent in that dispute. 
Perhaps, then, Devitt thinks the reach of Linguistics is less extensive that I 
have allowed. Perhaps he thinks that it can give us an account of properties of 
linguistic products, but can’t offer reasons for favouring one system of grammatical 
rules over another. For familiar reasons, that would be a mistake. Unless Devitt is 
prepared to limit Linguistics to studying superficial properties of actual productions, 
he has to allow that Linguists can make substantive claims about the bases of those 
productions, in the form of claims about the systems of grammatical rules that guide 
their production. For absent such an account, we really have no idea how we should 
project from properties of observed products to properties of unobserved products, or 
potential products. We would have no idea how to characterise those portions of 
language that have not in fact been used.8 
 
8. Explanatory priority. 
 
Let’s leave that issue in the air, and turn to issues surrounding (γ). Perhaps Devitt 
wants to argue that, although the relevant range of psychological properties and the 
relevant range of linguistic properties are mutually determining, still there are issues 
                                                 
8 For detailed discussion see Schiffer (1993). 
16 
of explanatory (or other) priority to be decided. And perhaps he thinks that they are to 
be decided in favour of linguistic, rather than competence, properties. 
 I think there are important issues in this area. And I think the precise answers 
to them depend upon, for instance, exactly what one hopes to explain. But I want to 
suggest two reasons for thinking that such issues, as they arise with respect to 
Linguistics, are likely to fall against Devitt. 
 Recall that we are presently assuming mutual determination. Hence, we are 
assuming that, if our aim is merely to describe the properties of language or 
competence, there is little or nothing to chose between starting with language and 
starting with competence. But for at least two reasons, we might think that 
competence has explanatory priority.  
 The first reason is that linguistic competence is part of human psychology 
more generally. That provides reason to hope for unification amongst theories of the 
various aspects of human psychology, including linguistic competence, and a 
consequent deepening of our understanding. By contrast, it is not clear to me how the 
study of linguistic properties is to be unified with other domains, except via the 
dogleg through competence.9 
 The second reason is that, unless we isolate linguistic properties through their 
connections with one or another type of competence, we are apt to face the following 
difficulty. Since we would be conceiving of languages and linguistic properties as 
autonomous objects of inquiry, the domain of inquiry would appear to include, not 
only French and English, but also Frenglish, a language involving some mix of the 
properties of French and English in a way that contravenes our best present account of 
Universal Grammar. The question we would then face is: Why does no one acquire a 
competence to recognise the ‘sentences’ of Frenglish on the basis of ordinary 
development? Why is there no human able to reliably track the properties of 
Frenglish, e.g. able to recognise its ‘sentences’?10 And the answer to that question 
cannot be that there is no such language as Frenglish, at least on the assumption that 
                                                 
9 Alternatively, if Devitt is right about the subvenience base of linguistic properties, it 
is not clear to me how the study of linguistic properties is to be unified with other 
domains, except via the dog-leg through thought. Although I do not think that Devitt 
is right, I don’t think that the question impacts in any straightforward way upon the 
major issues about explanatory priority. 
10 It is crucial to the case presented that Frenglish would contravene UG, rather than 
e.g. fitting UG disjunctively as might the competence of a bilingual speaker of French 
and English.  
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languages are not individuated through being indexed to ranges of competent 
speakers. The most reasonable answer is surely that no one acquires a competence to 
recognise Frenglish ‘sentences’ because the grammar of Frenglish flouts UG 
constraints. And that would be no explanation at all unless the fact that a language 
flouted UG constraints could explain why no competence “respects” the properties of 
that language. As far as I can see, the only explanations of the fact that no one has 
facility with Frenglish that have any chance of working are those that view UG 
constraints as constraints on the space of humanly possible competences. Hence, they 




In summary, I’ve tried to do the following. I began by considering some possible 
outcomes for the apparent dispute between Devitt and, e.g., Chomsky. I suggested 
that, before we engage further in the apparent dispute, we should check that the 
dispute is genuine, and try to get a handle on exactly what the dispute amounts to. 
Then I suggested that it is difficult to reconstruct a genuine dispute from what Devitt 
says. For all he says, it seems that his view and Chomsky’s might be notational 
variants, or different determinations of a single determinable view. Finally, I briefly 
considered some ways in which one might try to reinstate the appearance of genuine 
dispute. I argued, in effect, that the attempt presented Devitt with a sort of trilemma. 
On the first horn, he can try to reinstate a potential dispute, by viewing the study of 
language as partly independent of the study of competence. But the view of linguistic 
inquiry that would emerge is unacceptable. On the second horn, he can try to reinstate 
dispute by foisting on his opponent very demanding views about what a substantive 
theory of competence would be like. But then his opponent would be a straw 
opponent. Chomsky neither thinks that the study of grammar tells us very much about 
the physical realisation of competence nor that the study of grammar tells one 
everything that there is to know about competence. Finally, on the third horn, Devitt 
can try to reinstate a dispute, on the assumption of mutual determination, by arguing 
for the relative explanatory priority of language over competence. But in that case, it 
is plausible that Devitt would lose the dispute. 
 About the present status of the controversy, Devitt writes as follows: 
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If…[my]…argument is mistaken, it should be fairly easy for…[my critics]…to say 
why. (2007, p.22) 
 
It seems to me that Devitt attempts to argue for two claims: first that he is right about 
the object of Linguistics and, second, that Chomsky is wrong. In effect, I have 
suggested that he should, perhaps, be somewhat emboldened by his critics’ failure to 
show that he is wrong on the first point. Insofar as Devitt aims only to support the 
claim that Linguistics involves the study of language, I think that he is right about the 
object of Linguistics. But I hope that his critics will find some solace in my 
suggestion that they are right, and he is wrong, with respect to his second point. 
Linguistics is just as much concerned with the study of linguistic competence. And to 
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